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Introduction 
In assessing the significance of the Soviet invasion, Western a-
nalysts have been torn between two competing images. In the first 
image, favoured by George Kennan and others, the invasion is seen 
as a defensive reaction, a reflection of continuity in Soviet foreign 
policy, and not an ominous portent of increasingly bad things to come. 
A British analyst summed up the views of the first image: 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is no threat to the Western 
world. It is a defensive reaction taken to support a "friendly" 
government within the accepted Soviet sphere of influence. It 
is not in a strategic area nor is it part of the major Soviet offen-
sive. The West has over-reacted and is ignoring the significance 
of the invasion for it proves the failure yet again, of Soviet fo-
reign policy in an area that the Soviet Union considers vital to 
its protection.1 
In the second image, the elements of change in Soviet foreign 
policy are stressed, and the geostrategic implications of the Soviet 
move are ominous. Former President Carter said: 
The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet 
military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close 
to the Straits of Hormuz—a waterway through which most of 
the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting 
to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave 
threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.2 
While a final verdict on this dispute must be held in abeyance, it 
is possible three years later to examine the invasion as a case in which 
the Soviet Union used force in an attempt to accomplish its foreign 
policy objectives. Moreover, subsequent Soviet operations have pro-
vided the West with an opportunity to examine the combat perfor-
mance of Soviet forces in a low-intensity environment. Accordingly, 
this study will address the following questions: What factors motivated 
the Soviet use of force in Afghanistan?; What is the nature of Soviet 
military policy in Afghanistan?; and, What can Western analysts de-
duce from Soviet policy in Afghanistan which may enable them to 
better predict future Soviet moves? 
T o answer these questions, subsequent sections of this paper will 
address: 
* the prelude to the Soviet invasion, 
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* the invasion itself, 
* the motives for the invasion, 
* the nature of current Soviet military policy in Afghanistan, 
and 
* scenarios for future developments. 
Prelude to Invasion 
About the size of the state of Texas, Afghanistan is a mountainous 
country which would fit into anyone's definition of "underdeveloped." 
Only 12% of the land area of Afghanistan is cultivated. There are 
only a few thousand miles of paved roads and virtually no railraods. 
Literacy is estimated at only 10%. The per capita income was 168 
dollars per annum in 1978. Were it not for its position as a buffer 
state, we could be assured that it would hold very little interest for 
students of international affairs.3 
Successive Soviet regimes, mindful of Afghanistan's position, have 
always taken a strong interest in Afghan affairs, and relations between 
the two states have usually been close and cordial. Both states, emer-
ging in the afterglow of World War I, were the first to formally 
recognize each other and the first "friendship" treaty signed between 
the two states came about in February 1921. Furthermore, there is 
little doubt that Soviet interests in Afghanistan have, in the main, been 
security-related. For example, when Khrushchev began his open 
courtship of the Third World, Afghanistan was one of his first stops. 
Later, he justified his efforts: 
There's no doubt that if the Afghans hadn't become our friends, 
the Americans would have managed to ingratiate themselves 
with their "humanitarian aid," as they call it. The amount of 
money we spent in gratuitous assistance to Afghanistan is a drop 
in the ocean compared to the price we would have had to pay 
in order to counter the threat of an American military base on 
Afghan territory.4 
From 1956-77, the USSR and its allies trained over 4,000 Afghan 
officers and delivered more than $600 million worth of military sup-
plies. All of this was backed up by a 350-man advisory group. In the 
same period, the USSR also gave Afghanistan grants or credit lines 
totalling more than $1.3 billion, a sum which was exceeded in the 
Middle East and South Asia areas only by grants given to Egypt, India 
and Syria."' 
By 1975, however, the USSR began to experience trouble with 
the Afghan leader, Mohammad Daud, who had come to power with 
Soviet and local Marxist backing in 1973. Under the guise of adapting 
to "new realities" in the region, Daud began to move closer to Iran, 
accepting an offer of two billion dollars in aid and the Shah's promise 
(never fulfilled) to build a highway and a railroad to connect the two 
countries. In September 1975, Daud dismissed 40 high ranking of-
ficers and initiated military training agreements with Iran and Paki-
stan. He also reduced pressure on Pakistan in their border dispute 
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and began to move against both wings of the People's Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). As Daud moved toward Islam, the 
CPSU, fronted by the Indian and Iraqi communist parties, began to 
pressure the factions of the PDPA to unite and move into opposition, 
succeeding in May 1977.6 
The exact details of what followed in the spring of 1978 are, to 
this day, unclear. In April 1978, a leading Marxist, Mir Akbar Khaiber, 
was assassinated by persons unknown and, following a street de-
monstration, the PDPA leadership was arrested and the few remaining 
Marxists in the Daud government were purged. The leaders of the 
PDPA organized a revolt (with the aid of Soviet-trained elements in 
the Army and Air Force) and, 36 hours and perhaps as many as 2000 
dead later, the PDPA came to rule Afghanistan.7 Contrary to earlier 
speculations, there is very little reason to believe that the coup was 
Soviet engineered. Indeed, the entire coup was a "hip pocket" affair, 
more a monument to the disorganization and poor leadership of 
Daud, than to the skill and tactics of his opponents.8 
The PDPA which came to rule in Afghanistan was dominated by 
the Khalq ("Masses") faction, mainly composed of urban intellectuals 
divorced from the realities of life in the countryside. The party boss, 
Nur M. Taraki, became President and later on, his more radical dep-
uty, Hafizullah Amin became Prime Minister. Ironically, Taraki had 
once worked for the U.S. embassy in Kabul and Amin had been 
educated in New York at Columbia University. 
T o preserve the remnants of Western aid and to avoid the stigma 
of atheism, the two leaders initially soft-pedalled their communist 
sympathies, but they were unable to develop broad-based support for 
their regime. The Khalq's repressive policies alienated both their fellow 
Marxists of the Parcham ("Banner") faction and Muslim fundamen-
talists. Among the Khalq's ill-advised policies were: a purge of the 
army officer corps, a disastrous land reform policy which cut Afghan 
peasants off from local sources of funds,9 a change of the national 
flag from Islamic green to red, a reemphasis on women's rights, and, 
the July 1978 purge of the Parcham faction from the Afghan lead-
ership. Some Parchamis, like present leader Babrak Karmal, were posted 
to, and then exiled in, Eastern Europe, while other, lesser lights were 
jailed as political prisoners.10 The results of these policies were a revolt 
in the countryside and virtual pandemonium inside the government. 
On the international scene, Taraki and company were no more 
successful than they were at home. Increasingly, their old ally, the 
USSR, became their lone supporter. Following consultations with Gro-
myko in May 1978, Soviet aid increased, and in December 1978, the 
two countries signed a Treaty of Freindship, Good Neighbourliness 
and Cooperation.11 The door to the West was firmly shut in February 
1979 when the U.S. Ambassador, Adolph Dubs, was taken hostage 
by fanatics and killed when the Soviet-advised Afghan police, over 
American objections, assaulted the Kabul hotel where the Ambassador 
was being held captive. 
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In March 1979 the rebellion in Afghanistan began to take an 
ominous turn. An army mutiny, coupled with a rebel attack on the 
western city of Herat, turned into a crisis for the Soviet Union. An 
American analyst summed up the tragedy in this manner: 
. . . Soviet advisers were hunted down by specially assigned in-
surgent assassination squads conducting house-to-house searches. 
Westerners reportedly saw Russian women and children running 
for their lives from the area of the Soviet-built Herat Hotel. 
Those Russians that were caught were killed: some were flayed 
alive, others were beheaded and cut into pieces which were then 
paraded around the city impaled on pikes.12 
As might be expected, the Afghan government and the Soviets 
reacted strongly. On the Afghan side, domestic repression increased, 
with one estimate of the final total of slain political prisoners (1978-
1980) put as high as 20,000.13 In April 1979, an Afghan Army unit 
(with Soviet advisors in attendance) sacked the town of Kerala and 
massacred 640 of its male inhabitants.14 On the Soviet side, an au-
thoritative Pravda article of March 19th, signed by the pseudonymous 
I. Aleksandrov, first accused "some Western countries," China, Iran, 
and Pakistan of instigating unrest in Afghanistan. In the same issue 
of Pravda an Afghan dispatch blamed the Herat problem on Iranian 
Army personnel. On 21 March, an authoritative article under the pen 
name A. Petrov blamed the disturbance on Pakistan, China and West-
ern propaganda.15 In a more substantive vein, Soviet General Alexei 
Yepishev, chief of the main political directorate of the armed forces, 
was dispatched to Afghanistan and recommended an increase in mi-
litary aid and advisors, then estimated at 1000 personnel. Among the 
weapons subsequently provided were 100 T-62 tanks and 12 Mi-24 
helicopter gunships.16 
Despite increased pressure, the guerrilla movement, disorganized 
as it was, began to grow, and further escalatory measures were taken 
by the Soviets. From August to October, General Ivan Pavlovsky, 
Deputy Defense Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet 
Ground Forces, visited Afghanistan along with 12 other generals. At 
the same time, the role of Soviet advisors was broadened to include 
advising at the company-level and flying active combat missions. Later 
U.S. analysts would speculate that Pavlovsky's pessimistic assessment 
of the situation would be a key element in the Soviet decision to invade. 
Ironically, both Yepishev and Pavlovsky had performed similar func-
tions in Czechoslovakia in 1968.17 
In September 1979, after attending a nonaligned conference in 
Havana, Taraki visited Moscow. In retrospect, it appears likely that 
at this time Taraki was directed to oust his deputy, the radical Hafi-
zullah Amin, who had by then become the repressive power behind 
the throne. Amin's demise was not forthcoming, however. Upon Tar-
aki's return, a gun battle broke out in the Arg Palace and, when the 
smoke cleared, Amin was in control.18 Taraki was killed in the battle 
or assassinated shortly thereafter. 
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On the surface, relations between Amin and the USSR remained 
cordial. Under the surface, relations were deteriorating. No doubt, 
Brezhnev was embarrassed by Taraki's demise less than a week after 
their "fraternal" meeting. Were this not enough, the war had begun 
to go badly for Amin. In August, army forces had mutinied in Kabul. 
In September, rebels captured (at least temporarily) the Salang Pass, 
the key choke point on the road from Kabul to the USSR. Desertion 
by whole army units had become commonplace, and Amin was having 
difficulty staffing a government without Parcham or Taraki support-
ers. Adding to Amin's personnel problems, as many as 400,000 of his 
countrymen had become refugees. Despite Soviet pressure, Amin, 
acting like an "Afghan Tito," refused to broaden the base of the ruling 
party or to adopt more moderate policies. He rejected offers of Soviet 
troops, and a member of his government openly cirticized the Soviets 
for interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Shortly there-
after, Amin demanded the recall of Soviet Ambassador, A. Puzanov.19 
When a Soviet-supervised military operation failed in November, the 
Soviet leadership apparently decided that if the "revolution" were to 
succeed, the incumbent government would have to be changed. 
Invasion 
On December 8th, lead elements of a battalion-sized airborne 
unit landed at the Soviet-controlled air base at Bagram, north of 
Kabul. On the 20th, this unit moved north and cleared the Salang 
Pass area of rebel activity, thus opening the highway from Temerz in 
the Soviet Union to Kabul. This action was complemented by the call-
up of Soviet reservists in late October and November to man the five 
category 2 and 3 divisions then near the Afghan border. Bridge equip-
ment was brought up to the Oxus River (Amu Darya) and a command 
post for the invasion, headed by Marshal Sokolov, a First Deputy 
Defense Minister, was established at Temerz, near the Soviet-Afghan 
border.20 
Soviet diplomats were also busy around this time. Soviet Ambas-
sador Anatoly Dobrynin met with Secretary of State Vance to discuss 
the future prospects of U.S.-Soviet relations and shortly thereafter 
returned to the Soviet Union, apparently to brief the Politburo on 
any last minute developments in his area of responsibility. In Kabul, 
the new Soviet Ambassador, F. Tabayev, repeatedly tried to get Amin 
to agree to accept the offer of Soviet combat troops to supplement 
the 4,000 advisors already in country. Neither diplomat received any 
information which might have halted the next phase of the Soviet 
operation. 
On Christmas eve, despite prior American warnings and the pres-
ence of an Afghan armoured division nearby, the Soviets began land-
ing elements of an airborne division at Kabul Airport. On the 27th, 
following a three-day airlift which averaged 75-120 flights per day, 
troops from the division deployed to the Darulaman Palace outside 
Kabul, destroyed Amin's elite guard and its eight tanks, and killed 
President Amin. Babrak Karmal, head of the Parcham faction of the 
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PDPA, then in exile somewhere in USSR, was proclaimed President. 
Later that same day, senior Afghan Army officers, including the gen-
eral commanding the Central Army Corps, unwilling to cooperate 
with Soviets, were killed by Soviet troops.21 MVD Lieutenant General 
Viktor Paputin, the apparent commander of the "political" operations 
associated with the invasion, also died either in Kabul or later, perhaps 
by his own hand, in Moscow. Rumours of suicide were reinforced by 
the fact that Papuan's obituary appeared without Brezhnev's signa-
ture.22 Beginning on the 26th, two motorized rifle divisions, one des-
tined for Kabul and the other for Kandahar in southern Afghanistan, 
led the procession of Soviet troops across the border. By the first week 
in February, elements of seven Soviet divisions had been identified 
in Afghanistan. With the exception of the 105th Guards Airborne 
Division, these units were composed of at least 50% reserve-fillers on 
a 90-day call-up. Interestingly, a large number of the Soviet reservists 
(perhaps as many as 90%) were Central Asians.23 
Soviet forces were quite methodical in the operations which fol-
lowed. First, they moved to consolidate their hold over major roads 
and urban areas. Second, troops were deployed to the Iranian and 
Pakistani borders in an attempt to limit infiltration from the sanctuary 
areas in these two countries. Third, concurrent with the first and 
second steps, disloyal elements of the Afghan Army were disarmed 
or, if they refused as the 26th Afghan Parachute Regiment did, were 
destroyed by the superior firepower of adjacent Soviet units. 
Throughout the initial stages of the invasion, Soviet advisors played 
a key role in neutralizing Afghan Army units whose loyalty was ques-
tionable. This was accomplished by Soviet control over fuel and by 
deceptions, such as having the questionable units turn over their am-
munition for inventory or having them turn in vehicle batteries for 
winterizing.24 
In summary, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated 
again that the Soviet leadership is capable of decisive action to achieve 
policy goals, under low-risk circumstances. As an instrument of that 
policy, the Soviet military and security apparat proved that: (1) it is 
capable of rapid (though detectable) mobilization, (2) it can perform 
major operations without severe logistical breakdown, (3) it has suf-
ficient ground forces to mount major, conventional operations in low-
intensity environments outside of the Warsaw Pact or Chinese border 
areas, and (4) it is reliable in "political" operations, such as assassi-
nation and disarming unreliable friendly forces. All-in-all, the initial 
occupation of Afghanistan was a well-planned and well-executed 
operation. 
The methods used by the Soviets in Afghanistan were similar to 
those used in their 1968 invasions of Czechoslovakia and were "heirs" 
to the experience of their previous operations in the Third World. 
Without a doubt, the tactics and operational experience gained in 
Czechoslovakia, along with the experience of sustained airlifts in the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Ethiopian-Somali war in 1977-78 con-
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stituted "good training" for Afghanistan. Indeed, the ease with which 
the Soviets succeeded in Czechoslovakia may have made them over-
confident in the case of Afghanistan. An Austrian analyst has noted: 
The Soviet move in December 1979 clearly reflected Moscow's 
expectations of a quick and decisive solution. There was nothing 
in the initial Soviet military operations that betokened plans for 
a protracted conflict against durable opposition . . . Rather, the 
Soviet invasion had all the earmarks of a surgical thrust that was 
to protect the ineffective Afghan central authority against the 
encroaching cancer of insurgency . . .25 
Before examining what has since happened to Soviet forces in Af-
ghanistan, we must pause and attempt to reconstruct Soviet motives 
for invading. 
Motives 
Whatever the Soviet motives for invading Afghanistan were, they 
were hardly clarified by the amateurish propaganda which was gen-
erated to support invasion. The Soviet claim to have been "invited" 
was obviously false and it would really stretch the imagination to 
believe President Karmal's claim that Amin was a "CIA agent." Fur-
thermore, it did nothing for Soviet credibility to proclaim Amin's 
overthrow via a fake Radio Kabul announcement which came from 
a radio transmitter inside the Soviet Union.26 
Western analysts have also made assertions about the invasion 
which will not hold up under scrutiny. One such theory, put forth by 
George Kennan and others, speculated that the "moderate" Brezhnev 
was overruled on Afghanistan and that the invasion heralded the 
succession of, or at least a strong initiative from, a new, more militant 
Soviet leadership coalition. There is very little evidence which sup-
ports this assertion. Brezhnev strongly supported the invasion in sub-
sequent speeches as did all of the other Politburo members. In a 
demonstration of his political strength, Brezhnev, just one month 
prior to the invasion, was able to install his crony, Nikolai Tikhonov 
(now Prime Minister) as a full member of a Politburo already packed 
with Brezhnev's other lifelong associates.27 Brezhnev's political power 
was peaking in the fall of 1979. Even given limited working hours, it 
is unlikely that he was "overruled" or "out-voted" on such a critical 
issue. 
In reality, we would be hard pressed to discover any group or 
individual who would have spoken with authority against the invasion. 
We might hypothesize, for example, that the USA and World Econ-
omy institutes could have objected to the invasion. However, with one 
of their chief spokesman, Georgi Arbatov, sidelined with a heart at-
tack, the institutes apparently did not have a major input into the 
decision-making process. Speaking vaguely of the moderate "foreign 
policy elite," Robert Legvold of the Council on Foreign Relations tells 
us: "They were not consulted on Afghanistan, for as one of them 
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speculated after the invasion, when the crunch came late in the fall, 
'the old bosses' had no need of their musings—'the old bosses' felt in 
their bones what they must do."28 Were this not the case, it is still 
doubtful that the so-called moderates could have overcome the po-
sition which was apparently supported by first-hand observers such 
as Generals Yepishev and Pavlovsky, and former Ambassador Puza-
nov. In any case, the first and strongest speech in defense of the 
invasion by anyone in the Soviet leasdership came from Leonid Ilyich 
himself. 
The projected Soviet oil shortage also seems not to have provided 
an important impetus for the Soviet invasion. For one, the CIA's 
original pessimism on this matter has not been validated. While pro-
duction may have temporarily peaked, the current situation has not 
yet reached crisis proportions. Indeed, by the 1990s, the Soviets may 
even be able to exploit a favorable energy situation in their foreign 
policy dealings with the West.29 Furthermore, we give too much credit 
to the Soviet ability to control the future if we see their invasion as 
merely "Phase I" in their drive for Persian Gulf oil. Henry Kissinger 
reminded President Nixon in 1969 that: 
It is always tempting to arrange diverse Soviet moves into a grand 
design. The more esoteric brands of Kremlinology often purport 
to see each and every move as part of the carefully orchestrated 
score in which events inexorably move to the grand finale. 
Experience has shown that this has rarely if ever been the case. 
From the Cuban missile crisis . . . to the invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia, there has been a large element of improvisation in Soviet 
policy.30 
If the Soviets were intent on moving into Iran via military means, 
their invasion of Afghanistan was a poor move from both a political 
and a military standpoint.31 The invasion drew attention to the area 
and made the West more aware than ever of the critical importance 
of an independent Iran. After Afghanistan, any covert Soviet move 
into Iran carried a high risk of a strong American response in ac-
cordance with the Carter Doctrine. Furthermore, western Afghani-
stan is a poor springboard from which to invade Iran. This does not 
mean that the Soviets could not use Afghanistan as a base from which 
to invade Iran or that they would let pass a more "graceful" oppor-
tunity to move into Iran, but it does seem to indicate that their im-
mediate motives for invading Afghanistan lay elsewhere. 
In this regard, one area of Soviet concern seems to have been 
the relationship between the recent Islamic revival and the rapidly 
growing Soviet Muslim population of nearly 50 million people. By 
itself, however, the evidence to support an "invade Afghanistan to 
insulate Soviet Muslims" hypothesis is mixed. Supporting the "null" 
hypothesis is the fact that many Central Asian reservists were used to 
man the initial attacking divisions. Furthermore, recent newspaper 
accounts indicate that the Soviet leadership has not experienced any 
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problems over the invasion from their Muslim population.32 None-
theless, expressions of leadership anxiety over this question have re-
cently surfaced. In a December 1980 Armenian publication, a 
commentator stated that, "in the interest of its own global strategy, 
the US would like to use Islamic states against the USSR."33 In an 
example more to the point, singling out "young people" as especially 
vulnerable, Major General Yusif Zade, Chairman of the Azerbaijan 
SSR KGB, stated in a Bakinsky Rabochy article that: 
In view of the situation in Iran and Afghanistan the U.S. special 
services are trying to exploit the Islamic religion—especially in 
areas where the Muslim population lives—as one factor influ-
encing the political situation in our country.34 
Less than a week later, G.A. Aliyev, Azerbaijani party chief and can-
didate member of the Politburo, echoed Zade's concerns in the same 
newspaper.35 
On balance, we might dismiss the latter pronouncements as "bo-
geyman" tactics or, perhaps, as an oblique attempt to draw attention 
to Azerbaijan's critical location and thereby encourage an increase in 
the resource flow to that area in the new Five Year Plan. In any case, 
we must believe that Brezhnev et al are aware of and interested in the 
connection between "their" Muslims and their brethren (some of whom 
are descendants of the original Basmachis) in Afghanistan.36 Time may 
be the factor which allows resolution here. It is quite possible that the 
future, long-term effects of an Islamic Republic in Afghanistan were 
feared by a Soviet leadership which, at the same time, perceived no 
immediate threat from exposing Central Asian reservists to their fel-
low Muslims. 
The most immediate and important reasons that the Soviets pos-
sessed for invading Afghanistan can be subsumed under four head-
ings: pressure of events, geopolitics, commitment, and absence of 
constraints. 
As previously stated, it would have been very easy to have sur-
mised that the Amin regime could not hold on much longer. With 
the Parcham leaders dead or exiled, the likelihood of another Marxist 
government emerging "spontaneously" was nil. Armed intervention 
may have been seen as the only alternative to uncertain developments 
which probably would have militated against Soviet national interests, 
especially in light of recent developments in the area.37 
Southwest Asia has always been a key geopolitical concern of the 
Soviet Union, not only because it forms their southern border, but 
also because of their quest for ocean access, and their more recent 
concern over the Suez-Indian Ocean-Pacific route to the Soviet Far 
East. Unfortunately, from a Soviet point of view, the West was also 
strongly interested in the area, expecially where Iran and Pakistan 
were concerned. After World War II and the Soviet withdrawal from 
Iran in 1946, an uneasy geopolitical status quo emerged. Iran became 
decidedly pro-Western, but, for the most part, it also maintained 
28 
Conflict Quarterly 
"correct" relations with the Soviets. Afghanistan was normally pro-
Soviet, and although Pakistan was somewhat hostile to the Soviet Union, 
it was checked by India to the east and by Afghanistan to its west. In 
retrospect, even superpower naval activity in the Indian Ocean, prior 
to the fall of the Shah, seems to have been relatively insignificant. 
Preliminary talks had even been undertaken to demilitarize the entire 
area, but these came too late to bear fruit.38 
When the Shah of Iran fell in January 1979 and the Afghan 
insurgency against the Taraki regime heated up, the status quo quickly 
began to unravel. Iran became hostile to both superpowers, and it 
appeared as if an Islamic-based movement might topple the Afghan 
government. More significantly, U.S. fleet deployments increased, and 
the Soviets may have believed that the United States would soon move 
to reestablish their "position of strength" in Iran. The Soviets had 
previously been able to live with a pro-Western Iran, but "losing" 
Afghanistan now would create a bigger problem. If not kept solidly 
in the Soviet camp, Afghanistan could become the linchpin in a new 
NATO-Chinese encirclement of the Soviet Union. In Soviet eyes, the 
American fixation on its "problem" with Iran was, in part, a cover for 
grander purposes. A Petrov described the situation in this manner: 
One needs no special powers of insight to discern the motives 
behind the US's actions. There are people in Washington who 
are persistently seeking something to replace the positions lost 
as a result of the overthrow of the Shah's regime in Iran. Holes 
were found in the notorious "strategic arc" that Americans have 
been building for decades near the Soviet Unions' southern bor-
ders; to mend these holes, an effort was launched to subjugate 
the Afghan people, as well as the peoples of other countries in 
this region.39 
Soviet concern over a deteriorating strategic position was also 
reinforced by their security commitment to Afghanistan. Article 4 of 
their friendship treaty states that in extremis both parties will, "take 
appropriate measures with a view to ensuring the security, inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of the two countries."40 While this 
represents far less than an ironclad guarantee of Afghan security, 
one can imagine the great loss of prestige that the Soviets would face 
if a Marxist "revolution" on their own border were to fall to "reac-
tionary forces." This commitment to Afghanistan was accentuated by 
previous "losses" to "counterrevolutionary forces," such as in Chile. 
In a widely reprinted interview in Pravda, Brezhnev himself jus-
tified the invasion by saying that: 
T o act in any other way would mean to leave Afghanistan to be 
torn to pieces by imperialism, to allow aggressive forces to repeat 
here what they were able to do, for example, in Chile, where 
the freedom of the people was drowned in blood. To act in any 
other way would mean to look on passively as a center of serious 
threat to the security of the Soviet state arose on our southern 
frontier.41 
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In calculating their plans for the invasion, the Soviets may have 
decided that they had little to lose in the area of East-West relations. 
While many U.S. analysts saw the Soviet invasion as the first decisive 
battle of a new Cold War, Soviet analysts found the origins in U.S. 
behavior prior to the crisis. Particularly vexing from the Soviet per-
spective was the NATO plan to station American Pershing II IRBM's 
(Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles) and GLCM's (Ground-Launched 
Cruise Missiles) in Europe to offset the growing Soviet advantage in 
Eurostrategic missilry. While the plan was not officially approved, 
Pravda (around the same time that the decision to invade Afghanistan 
was made) reported that German, British, Italian and Belgian acqui-
escence had been received. Gromyko, on a visit to Bonn, loudly and 
threateningly complained of the same thing in a news conference on 
November 25th.42 
Prospects for Sino-Soviet relations were also dim. In October-
November 1979, talks in Moscow on an extension of the 1950 Sino-
Soviet Treaty again found China putting forth claims to Soviet ter-
ritory and, in a Soviet view, behaving rather stubbornly.43 At the same 
time, the Carter administration all but announced the end of its even-
handed policy toward the USSR and the PRC, announcing that Sec-
retary of Defense Brown would visit the PRC in January 1981. 
The leading Soviet Americanist, Georgi Arbatov, summed up the 
Soviet view in this manner: 
It was before the events in Afghanistan that the US took other 
steps: it froze the arms limitation talks, put into effect a policy 
of delaying the SALT II Treaty that almost amounts to its re-
jection, sharply heightened the pitch of anti-Soviet hysteria and 
accelerated rapprochement with Peking on an anti-Soviet basis. 
Thus, it was clear by mid-December that the US was executing 
an abrupt policy swing . . .44 
In effect, the Soviets may have concluded that the United States 
and its allies could do little more to hurt the Soviet Union. It may 
also have occurred to them that Western furor over a rapid, successful 
invasion might dissipate quickly, as it did after the invasion of Czech-
oslovakia in 1968, or that international furor against the Soviet Union 
might be deflected by aggressive U.S. actions in Iran.45 
Current Policy 
Soviet military policy in Afghanistan cannot be analyzed in a 
vacuum. To understand the "big picture," international and Afghan 
domestic political factors must be taken into consideration. On the 
international scene, Soviet combat activities in Afghanistan have placed 
an enormous burden on Soviet foreign policy. Since the Soviet in-
vasion, the USSR has been condemned three times in the UN General 
Assembly, each time by more than 100 nations, and again by the 
foreign ministers of Islamic countries in January and in May 1980. 
In other areas, more than 50 nations boycotted the Moscow Olympics, 
and Cuba, in part out of guilt by association, lost a chance for a Security 
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Council seat. The Soviet Union suffered for more than a year under 
a U.S. grain embargo and ban on technology transfer. The U.S. stepped 
up its presence in the Indian Ocean and SALT II was formally shelved 
because of the invasion. Even worse from a Soviet perspective, the 
invasion has contributed to greater Chinese-American cooperation in 
the defense field. 
On the domestic scene, the Soviets apparently believed that de-
cisive show of armed might, coupled with a change in rulers, would 
reunite the ruling party, restore order to Afghanistan, and prevent 
a potential "encirclement" of the Soviet Union. All of this would, at 
the same time, preserve the neo-socialist "revolution" on their south-
ern border. Delivered in the combat trains of the Soviet invasion force, 
Babrak Karmal, the Soviet-picked replacement for Amin, was to have 
restored domestic political order, while the Soviet forces were to have 
frightened the rebels back to their villages. 
To put it mildly, the Soviets have not accomplished their objec-
tives. Babrak Karmal has failed in his efforts to reunited the Khalq 
("Masses") and Parcham ("Banner") factions of the People's Demo-
cratic Party of Afghanistan. While the exact details of the political 
situation are unclear, it appears that many of the hard line Khalq 
faction have moved into opposition and, in some case, have even 
swung to the rebel side. This will continue to haunt the Karmal gov-
ernment because the Khalq, by some accounts, outnumbers the Par-
cham faction by a factor of two to one. Moreover, the Khalq is particularly 
strong among Army officers, as evidenced by the July 1980 revolt of 
the 10,000 men of the 14th Afghan Armored Division which took 
place when the government attempted to relieve its Khalqi com-
mander.46 In March and April 1982, according to the U.S. State De-
partment, a large number of Khalqi army officers were arrested for 
plotting against the regime. In September 1982, the Khalqi general 
commanding the Central Army Corps was found shot to death in his 
offices under mysterious circumstances apparently not related to com-
bat with the rebels. 
The Afghan Army is itself in disarray. Disillusionment with the 
government has produced the defections of whole units to the rebel 
side. The Army has disintegrated from about 100,000 to 30,000 or 
less. In fact, even the paltry force which is left is more burden than 
boon to the Soviets. In August 1980, fearing further defections, the 
Soviets were forced to remove all antiair and antitank weapons from 
the Afghan forces to preclude their falling into rebel hands.47 
To bolster their forces, take the pressure off Soviet units, and 
perhaps to regain some autonomy, the Karmal government has re-
peatedly resorted to desperate measures. In January 1981, a new draft 
law was promulgated and press gangs have reportedly been rounding 
up teenagers as young as 14 years of age. Paramilitary groups, "De-
fense of the Revolution Battalions," have been formed but, in spite 
of high pay, they have generally proven to be ineffective. In July 
1981, the government, by design or incompetence, committed some 
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300 cadets of the Afghan Military Academy to combat only 16 miles 
from Kabul! The results were devastating: as many as 70 were killed 
and 200 defected.48 
In short, public support for the Karmal regime has been and 
continues to be non-existent. Massive riots took place in Kabul over 
a seven-day period February 1980 and again in April of that year. In 
1981, the attempt to form a National Fatherland Front—a drawback 
to the old national tribal assembly—failed. Over 20% of the Afghan 
population has left the country for refugee camps—2.8 million in 
Pakistan, with a million or more living under similar conditions in 
Iran. One analyst has reported that some 2-3 million people in central 
Afghanistan are near starvation.49 
The military side of the policy equation is not much better for 
the Soviet Union. To date, Soviet strategy appears to have been to 
hold the major centers of communication, limit infiltration, and de-
stroy local strongholds at minimum cost to their own forces. This last 
item has, in the main, been carried out by the more than 240 helicopter 
gunships and the several squadrons of fighter aircraft which are in 
the country. By intent or in effect, Soviet policy has been a combi-
nation of "scorched earth" and, in anthropologist Louis Dupree's words, 
"migratory genocide!"50 The Eastern provinces have been depopu-
lated, cities rubbled, and the narrow corridor joining China and Af-
ghanistan has been occupied by Soviet forces. 
All of this has not produced the desired results. Indeed, since 
January 1981, rebels, bolstered by aid from other nations, have be-
come bolder. Major fighting has taken place in all of the eastern 
provinces and around every major city. Contrary to Soviet propa-
ganda, the bulk of the fighting has been done by Soviet troops, some-
times opposed by mutinous Afghan Army forces. A Western summary 
of recent, major combat actions included the following: 
Between April 13 and July 15, 1981, at least 107 high-level Af-
ghan Communist officials and Soviet officers were assassinated 
in Kabul, on two occasions at the very gate of the Soviet Embassy 
at midday. In Herat, a noman's-land for two years, Soviet soldiers 
are killed in their barracks. Unable to wrest Kandahar from the 
resistance, the Russians bombed much of it into rubble in June; 
two weeks later, the resistance again controlled Kandahar. On 
June 19, the main Soviet airbase at Bagram was set ablaze, and 
fuel ammunition dumps, and aircraft were destroyed. In July, 
the resistance won Gulbahar on the north-south supply road. 
The landscape is littered with ruined Soviet tanks and armor.51 
In 1982, rebel strength and activity has forced the Soviets to 
employ larger units. One offensive in the Panjshir Valley (the sixth 
in three years) involved at least 12,000 troops for over 90 days with 
very little apparent benefit for the Soviets. In all, despite the costs, 
the Soviets are preparing for a prolonged stay. Permanent logistics 
facilities and barracks are being constructed. Airfields are being up-
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graded and at least one permanent bridge across the Amu Darya 
(Oxus River) has been completed. The tour of duty for Soviet soldiers 
has also been set at two years.52 
Operationally, new or untried Soviet equipment (e.g., the im-
proved BMP, the AK74 rifle, the Hind helicopter, the AGS 17 au-
tomatic grenade launcher, the new SU25 ground attack fighter) has 
been tested, but the innovations needed to turn a conventional army 
(six motorized rifle divisions and five two thousand man air assault 
brigades) into an effective counterinsurgency force are just beginning. 
For example: the border with Pakistan has been mined with small, 
scatterable, anti-personnel devices; trees have been cleared from road-
sides; reservists have been replaced by regular forces; some tank units 
(with great diplomatic fanfare) have been removed but then replaced 
by infantry units, and increasingly, airmobile commandos have been 
employed in support of ground operations.53 
According to two highly-detailed U.S. State Department reports 
Soviet forces have used chemical weapons in at least half of the prov-
inces of Afghanistan. Witnesses have made total of 59 separate inci-
dent reports and the State Department noted that at least 36 of the 
reports were corroborated by additional evidence. Amazingly, the 
Soviet use of chemical weapons—incapacitants, lethal chemicals, and 
even the dreaded mycotoxin biological weapons—has continued apace 
even after the first detailed U.S. report appeared in March 1982. The 
reports conservatively estimate that the attacks resulted in at least 
3000 deaths. One other ominous detail did hot go unnoticed: detailed 
survey and monitoring operations following some of the strikes showed 
that the Soviets were obviously "interested in studying after-affects, 
lethality, or some other quasi-experimental aspect of a new chemical 
weapon."54 
There is very little reliable information on the performance of 
Soviet troops in Afghanistan. A distillation of the scant information 
which is available reveals that: 
1. The Soviets initially relied on Central Asian reservists to man their 
invasion force. While some reports no doubt exaggerated the per-
centage of Central Asians present, it is also clear that the Soviets 
violated their non-territorial manning "SOP" by drawing very 
heavily on the Muslim republics. These soldiers were poorly trained 
and, in all probability, politically unreliable. They were replaced 
by regular forces within three months of the start of the invasion. 
By using predominantly Muslim troops, the Soviets may have 
been trying to "low profile" their mobilization, believing that a 
mobilization in a limited geographic area—especially one with an 
abundant work force—might have been less noticeable than a na-
tional call-to-arms. Moreover, the Soviets may have believed that 
the Central Asian troops would be useful for interpreting and 
related tasks. In any case, this ploy backfired. Central Asian soldiers 
in the Soviet armed forces are frequently assigned to construction 
battalions and would thus be poorly trained for combat operations. 
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Furthermore, the use of Tadjik and Uzbek troops may have al-
ienated the dominant Pathan majority group in Afghanistan. Fi-
nally, reports have even surfaced that some Central Asian troops 
defected or deserted rather than engage in combat with their co-
religionists.55 
2. The initial complement of regular troops were not trained in coun-
terinsurgency or mountain warfare techniques. One Soviet source 
even reported that "it took a while for (an Afghan) soldier to believe 
that the majority of Soviet servicemen had first seen mountains 
here—in Afghanistan."56 Not finding the Chinese or American 
"agents" whom they were told were causing the trouble has also 
been bad for morale.57 
3. Soviet tactics still tend toward an overreliance on motorized rifle 
and tank troops employed in "sweep" operations. Air assault op-
erations—usually of company or battalion strength—are normally 
conducted in conjunction with movements my motorized rifle units. 
Much of the Soviet operational experience apparently has been in 
road clearing operations.58 On a whole, airborne or air assault 
troops seem to be held in higher esteem by the guerrillas than 
troops from the motorized deivision. 
Rebel ambushes of various sizes have proven to be very ef-
fective. An Afghan Army major described guerrilla tactics in a 
conversation with a Soviet reporter: 
Usually they operate in groups of 30-40 men. They used to 
assemble in larger gangs. They prefer to use ambushes. By 
bridges, or in defiles. They destroy the bridge or block the road 
and then open fire from the commanding heights. If a strong 
army subunit is moving, they allow the reconnaissance and the 
combat security detachment to go by. All of a sudden, they open 
up with volleys of well-aimed fire and then rapidly withdraw. 
They mine the roads, then cover the mined areas with small 
arms fire. The hand of professional foreign instructors can be 
felt at work.59 
4. The pace of operations ranges from frantic "offensives" or "da-
mage limiting" operations, to long periods of boredom. Soviet so-
ldiers are not coping very well with this and reports of the use of 
hashish have surfaced. Four separate sources, have confirmed the 
widespread use of hashish and the fact that Soviet soldiers have 
even traded truck parts, uniforms, shoes, ammunition, and even 
rifles for hashish.60 This problem has apparently been exacerbated 
by a prohibition on vodka for enlisted soldiers. 
5. The Soviet populace is eager to learn about what is happening in 
Afghanistan. Censorship within the military and the media is strictly 
enforced. Accounts of Soviet soldiers in combat are rare, usually 
anecdotal, and very heavy on propaganda content. In spite of this 
fact, some truth has emerged in Soviet sources. For example, 
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Service on Afghanistan's soil makes special demands on all serv-
icemen. It is not easy being far from our motherland . . . The 
difficult climate conditions take their toll. The lack of roads 
presents quite a few difficulties. And how exhausting exercises 
in the mountains are, when each metre takes a tremendous and 
intensive effort and it is hard to breathe . . . There are consid-
erable other ordeals. The Dushmans are continuing their pira-
tical onslaughts.61 
All in all, the Soviet forces in Afghanistan have not demonstrated 
the tactical flexibility, the small-unit expertise or the political sensitivity 
needed to put down an insurgency. Soviet unpreparedness can be 
traced to their initial estimate of the situation. There is no indication 
that the Soviets ever believed that they would get bogged down in an 
extended counterinsurgency operation. More likely, informed by the 
estimates of the now-retired CINC Soviet Ground Forces, Ivan Pav-
lovsky, the Soviet leadership envisioned an operation like their 1968 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, where overwhelming force met little re-
sistance and left Soviet officials time to restore political stability. They 
failed to consider both the warlike nature of the Afghan freedom 
fighters and the difficulty of supressing a revolt in a mountainous 
area the size of Texas. Of these two conditions, the fierceness of the 
freedom fighters is the most troublesome. While it is impossible to 
calculate their exact fighting strength, the estimated 80,000 guerrillas 
in Afghanistan are more than able to occupy the attention of 105-
120,000 Soviet soldiers presently in Afghanistan. 
Even given better training and tactics, the number of Soviet troops 
in Afghanistan is insufficient for the task. Most observers agree that 
since the onset of 1982 the Soviet hold on Afghanistan has slipped. 
While territorially-based estimates are suspect, experts have increased 
their estimate of rebel-controlled territory from 75% (December 1980) 
to as much as 90% (December 1981). While still poorly armed, the 
freedom fighters have benefited from defections from the Afghan 
Army and the generosity of other states, estimated by one source to 
have totalled nearly $100 million to date, though this seems a bit 
exaggerated.<i2 
Disunity is without a doubt the freedom fighters' greatest prob-
lem, preventing them from being able to successfully coordinate major 
offensive operations. On the other hand, disunity may not rebound 
to the Soviet advantage. Even if the Soviets were to attempt to ne-
gotiate with the rebels, they would be unable to find anyone who could 
speak authoriatatively for all of the resistance groups. Of course, any 
Afghan leader who would claim such a right would no doubt have a 
very short life expectancy. 
Scenarios for Future Developments 
Many scenarios could be drawn up for future developments in 
Afghanistan. Two seem highly unlikely to occur: a quick Soviet defeat, 
or a quick Soviet victory. To defeat the Soviets, the disunited rebel 
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groups would have to come together, receive massive quantities of 
arms, destroy the Soviet divisions in the countryside, and then eject 
the remainder from the urban areas and the center of communication. 
Nothing of this scale appears in the offing, and if it ever were to come 
to pass, Soviet troops in Afghanistan, backed up by another 30,000 
across the border could easily handle the quasiconventional operations 
which would ensue. 
For dissimilar reasons, a quick Soviet victory is also unlikely. Every 
additional increment of Soviet aid makes the Karmal government 
appear more like the agent of the "foreign devils." Resistance contin-
ues to grow, not only in the countryside but also on the campuses and 
in the cities. 
On the military side of the policy equation, the Soviets have very 
little to rejoice over. The Afghan borders, especially the 1,000-mile 
stretch with Pakistan, are nearly impossible to seal off. Roads and 
airfields are scarce and crowded, and dramatic additions to troop 
strength would necessitate great improvements in the logistical in-
frastructure.63 Consequently, the scenarios which reigns at present is 
one of stalemate. The Soviets will continue in the foreseeable future 
to control, for the most part, the roads and urban areas by day while 
the countryside and the night will be in the province of the illusive 
freedom fighters. A Pakistani official summed up the Soviet dilemma 
in Afghanistan: 
The Soviets can continue to occupy the country, but they cannot 
win over the people. The longer they stay, the more they alienate 
the people. The more they alienate the people, the longer thy 
must stay. This Russian dilemma is also the Afghan dilemma, 
and both seem condemned to suffer its consequences.64 
On the other hand, the stalemate which exists at present is by no 
means permanent. Unlike the United States in Vietnam, the Soviets 
are not thousands of miles from the fighting, nor will they be subject 
to the time pressure of an impatient public opinion, nurtured by an 
inquisitive fourth estate. One may also note here that the Soviets have 
in the past shown a tolerance for perservering under adverse con-
ditions over long periods of time. For example, their own counter-
guerrilla operations in the Central Asian republics lasted for nearly 
a decade after their own civil war in the early 1920s. In a real sense, 
time, contiguity, and military power ultimately favor the Soviets in 
Afghanistan. As an emerging great power, conscious of its status, and 
beset by internal difficulties the Soviet leadership may well believe 
that in Afghanistan, there is no substitute for victory. 
Future Soviet policy choices on Afghanistan will not be made in 
a vacuum. The question of "what will work in Afghanistan," will be 
subordinated to policy issues of greater import for the Soviet Union, 
such as war avoidance, U.S.-Soviet relations, and the possibilities for 
trade and arms control with the West. Domestic conditions, such as 
economic problems or a succession struggle could also influence Soviet 
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choices. Long-range predictions are made doubly difficult here by the 
fact that a single stimulus could bring about a wide range of policy 
responses. For example, if Afghanistan became an issue in the post-
Brezhnev succession struggle, there is no telling at this point whether 
that would tend to generate a more draconian military solution or 
some form of negotiated settlement. War and politics are both the 
province of chance. 
While a thorough examination of all possible variables is beyond 
the scope of this paper, it is possible to examine some of the major 
options which the Soviets may or may not undertake. Two policy 
options which have apparently been rejected by the Soviets are: an-
nexation and the "direct approach" of invading Pakistan to destroy 
rebel sanctuaries. Four policy options which the Soviets might pursue 
are: reinforcement, Afghanization, negotiated settlement, the Baluch 
option. 
Reinforcement: The Soviets might choose to continue the same 
types of operations inside Afghanistan, but at dramatically increased 
troop levels. Although the Soviets have added more than 20,000 troops 
since December 1981, some experts have estimated that a total of as 
many as 300,000 soldiers (more than double the number presently 
assigned) would be needed to begin to pacify the country.65 While a 
plan of this magnitude would be difficult logistically, it could force 
the freedom fighters back to their sanctuaries in Iran and Pakistan. 
Unfortunately, even if it were possible to limit infiltration, the freedom 
fighters would be free to renew their efforts whenever the Soviets let 
down their guard. On the other hand, a dramatic reinforcement, if 
coupled with an effective strategy of pacification, could give the Soviets 
time to pursue the policies needed to end the insurgency. This option 
is not an end in itself, but it may be an essential first step to accomplish 
the next option. 
Afghanization: This option would call for the long-term rebuilding 
of the Afghan government and armed forces, depending mainly on 
new, Soviet trained cadres to provide the leadership. This might pro-
vide a long-term solution, but efforts at this type of policy to date 
have shown little immediate return. This is not surprising since the 
Soviets have not generally been successful in developing Soviet-style 
cadres in Third World countries. Indigenous, pro-Soviet movements 
have been successful, but only when they were able to draw on na-
tionalism or ethnic/tribal affiliations. This is apparently beyond the 
realm of the probable in Afghanistan. 
Negotiated Settlement: Up to now, the Soviets have rejected neu-
tralization schemes proposed by Europeans, the latest of which was 
the July 1981 "Carrington Plan," rejected by the USSR only 24 hours 
after its submission. The Soviets have insisted that the Afghan go-
vernment must be made a party to any talks. This would legitimize 
the Karmal government and provide a partial justification for the 
Soviet claim that the freedom fighters constitute "outside interfer-
ence." In Western eyes, this in turn would be an unacceptable basis 
for starting negotiations. 
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Some analysts have highlighted the U.N. attempt to hold "indirect 
talks" in Geneva in June 1982. All sides have praised the effort but 
progress has been slow. The Iranians only "observed" the talks and 
Pakistan has been criticized for foot dragging. More importantly, al-
though a wave of optimism accompanied the Andropov succession, 
the official Soviet position has not substantively changed since early 
1980. As stated in an authoritative article in the December 16, 1982 
issue of Pravda, the Soviet Union will only withdraw its "limited con-
tingent" after there has been a cessation of "outside interference" with 
concurrent guarantees by Iran, Pakistan (and presumably the United 
States) that this "interference" will not be renewed. 
For its part, the West should enter any such agreement with its 
eyes open. The Soviets should not be allowed to gain through diplo-
macy what they could not win on the battlefield. Furthermore, if we 
assume that Soviet leaders, like our own, formulate policy with an eye 
on "lessons learned" in previous situations, even a limited success in 
Afghanistan could further increas the Politburo's confidence in the 
Soviet military establishment and make them more prone to use force 
to solve future foreign policy problems.66 In short, it is in the Western 
interest to insure that the lessons which the Soviets learn from Af-
ghanistan are recorded on the debit side of the balance sheet. 
The Baluch Option: In spite of its many problems in Afghanistan, 
the Soviet Union is now in a position to exploit ethnic rivalries in the 
area. The Baluch people, who occupy parts of Iran, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan, are, by some accounts, receiving aid and advice from Soviet 
agents. Turbulent Pakistan might represent a potential target, all the 
more tempting because thousands of Baluchis died fighting the Pak-
istani army in the early 1970s. Recognition of an independent Bal-
uchistan inside of southern Pakistan could ultimately net the Soviets 
access to the Indian Ocean port of Gwadar.67 In any case, the Balu-
chistan issue could be a convenient lever to pressure Pakistan to limit 
its support of the freedom fighters. It also carries the advantage of 
being an "indirect approach" which would enable the Soviets to deny 
direct participation. While few in the West would believe this, it is 
also true that support for "liberation movements" is something which 
carries little stigma when compared to outright invasions. 
It is, of course, quite possible that the Soviets will continue at-
tempts at "muddling through," knowing they cannot quit, but unable 
as of yet to muster the political wherewithal needed to "win" the war. 
This appears to be the option which they are taking at present. The 
Kremlin will undoubtedly gauge their policy in Afghanistan in part 
by the level of risk and reward promised by their relations with Wash-
ington. The situation in Poland also represents a temporary restraint 
on Soviet policy toward Afghanistan. The possible requirement the-
atre is a significant material constraint on new Soviet initiatives in 
Afghanistan. The fate of the Afghan rebels may well be hostage to 
the activities of their less violent cousins in Gdansk. 
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In sum, one may predict a near-term continuance of the status 
quo—a hungry Soviet Union pitted against an indigestible Afghani-
stan. Options exist for the Soviets in the long-term, but each is costly 
and some are dangerous. In any case, the West must avoid compla-
cency and remain alert. 
Conclusions and Observations 
This section will be oriented toward drawing conclusions on the 
material presented above. Some general observations on the relation-
ship Soviet power and use of force will be made, followed by more 
specific conclusions which may assist analysts in predicting future 
Soviet moves. 
In their seminal study on Soviet foreign policy, Jan Triska and 
David Finley stated that: "Soviet crisis behavior was found to be con-
servative rather than impulsive, and rational (not willing to lose) rather 
than nonrational."68 In the main, Soviet actions in Afghanistan bear 
out this description. In no instance, did the Soviets move outside the 
boundaries of their physical capabilities. Although many miscalcula-
tions were made, the Soviets did proceed methodically, moving from 
aid to advisors to combat troops, only after information had been 
gathered my military experts on the ground. Similar techniques had 
previously worked in Angola and in Ethopia. Soviet methods and 
troops had been successful in Czechoslovakia and Cuban proxies had 
performed well in Angola and Ethiopia. 
What was different in the case of Afghanistan was not the pattern 
of crisis behavior but changes in situational factors. In the midst of 
such "progressive developments" as the post-Vietnam syndrome in 
the U.S., and turbulence in the Third World, the Soviets progressed 
from being a regional power to a bona fide global power. 
Soviet policy analysts, of course, did not fail to recognize the 
flexibility which their new instruments and favorable circumstance 
had brought to them. At the 24th Party Congress in 1971, Andrei 
Gromyko stated that "there is no question of any significance which 
can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it."69 In 
1976, L.I. Brezhnev, at the 25th Party Congress, in remarks appar-
ently tailored for both internal and external consumption, saluted the 
success of the liberation movements in Angola and Vietnam and re-
lated Soviet policy in the Third World to peaceful coexistence and 
detente: 
Detente does not in the slightest abolish, and it cannot abolish 
or later, the laws of class struggle. No one should expect that in 
conditions of detente the Communists will become reconciled to 
capitalist exploitation or that monopolists will become supporters 
of the revolution . . .70 
In 1977, support for national liberation struggles was even written 
into the new Soviet constitution, in marked contrast to the 1936 doc-
ument which did not even contain a section on foreign policy. Marshal 
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Grechko, the late Soviet Defense Minister, related these developments 
to the Soviet armed forces: 
At the present stage the historic function of the Soviet Armed 
Forces is not restricted to their function in defending our Moth-
erland and the other socialist countries. In its foreign policy 
activity the Soviet state purposefully opposes the export of coun-
terrevolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national 
Liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialists' aggression 
in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear.71 
In short, the Soviet Union has proclaimed that it is a socialist 
global power and is demanding the right to act as such, not only in 
its recognized East European sphere of influence, but also in the Third 
World, especially in the security sensitive areas around or near its 
periphery. In an "ideologically correct" explanation of Soviet activities 
in Afghanistan, one can even find an extension of the Brezhnev Doc-
trine. An unsigned (and presumably authoritative) article in the Soviet 
weekly New Times asked: 
What is the internationalist solidarity of revolutionaries? Does it 
consist only of moral and diplomatic support, of verbal wishes 
of success, or also of material assistance, including military help, 
given in definite, extraordinary circumstances, and especially in 
a situation of manifest massive outside interference? 
The history of the revolutionary movement confirms the moral 
and political legitimacy of this form of assistance and support. 
Such were the case, for instance in Spain in the 1930s, and in 
China in the 1920s and 1930s. Today, when there exists a system 
of socialist states, it would be simply ridiculous to question the 
right to such assistance . . . To refuse to use the possibilities at 
the disposal of the socialist countries would signify virtually eva-
ding performance of the internationalist duty and returning the 
world to the times when imperialism could throttle at will any 
revolutionary movement.72 
Thus, one can see that as usual in the case of Afghanistan, the 
USSR has managed to skillfully blend Marxist-Leninist ideology and 
perceived national interest into a coherent conceptual whole. Soviet 
security and prestige are aided, abetted, and explained by a policy of 
proletarian internationalism, a policy which is in turn made credible 
by the accumulation of Soviet military power. In effect, Soviet policy 
in Afghanistan was neither realist, nor socialist, but both. It was also 
flawed; indeed, it has turned into the second (behind Vietnam) most 
costly, long-term superpower blunder in the post-war era. 
Among the general "lessons learned" here, pride of place belongs 
to the Soviet concept of power. Like many other great powers, the 
Soviets have confused force with power, and power with influence. 
The instruments which could bring them to the Rhine have not proven 
well-suited to combat opponents whose power base is spiritual and 
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traditional in nature. Again, great conventional military power has 
tempted its holder to fish in troubled waters, leading to another ex-
ample of great powers making great blunders. 
Has the West learned anything which we can apply in a predictive 
framework to future Soviet foreign policy? This author would answer 
that question affirmatively and cite the following observations: 
1. Afghanistan demonstrates that regional moves by the Soviets are 
not divorced from a global geopolitical context. An especially im-
portant role here is played by Soviet perceptions of recent U.S.-
Soviet relations. Having seen little finite reaction from the U.S. 
over Soviet moves in Angola, Ethiopia and over the original Marxist 
coup in Afghanistan, the Soviet may have felt overly secure in 
moving into Afghanistan. Furthermore, since prospects for detente 
were at a low point, they may have felt that no substantive future 
benefits were in jeopardy. Fearing no sticks, and expecting no 
carrots, the Soviets may have felt that, bereft of "hope or fear," 
they were free to pursue a policy which they perceived as "nec-
essary."73 
2. T h e old fear of "capitalist encirclement" is not dead; indeed, the 
Soviet perception of a demi-alliance between the PRC and the 
United States has given it new life. Soviet policy is thus more in-
terested and may become more militarily active in areas nearest 
the Soviet borders. Like Afghanistan, future Soviet moves in the 
Third World may well be generated more by perceptions of "ne-
cessity" than by perceptions of "opportunity." 
3. Friendship treaties and high levels of military assistance can be-
come prestige commitments. Like the U.S., the Soviets do not want 
to be perceived as deserting their allies.74 To a large extent, future 
commitments will be determined by prior investments. This should 
not be interpreted to mean that, wherever one finds a Friendship 
Treaty, one has found an area ripe for direct Soviet intervention. 
As demonstrated in the case of Afghanistan, direct Soviet inter-
vention is a last resort measure, one taken only after the old stand-
bys—arms sales, advisors, and proxies—are either ruled out or 
overcome by events; and one taken only in the presence of unique 
and generally low-risk circumstances. 
4. Organizational processes in the military realm appear to be more 
readily influenced by recent "lessons learned" as opposed to more 
profound lessons learned long ago. On the subject of Afghanistan, 
there is little evidence to suggest that the lessons of the Basmachi 
period were part of the Soviet mindset; but, on the other hand, 
there is much material to suggest that "failure" in Chile and "suc-
cess in Czechoslovakia" were important pieces of conceptual bag-
gage for Soviet decisionmakers.75 
The Czech case, as previously mentioned, seems to have exer-
ted an especially strong influence both on the planning and the 
execution of the Afghan invasion. General's Yepishev and Pavolv-
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sky were involved in both cases. In the execution, the use of air-
landed troops to seize key communications facilities, the use of 
deception, the neutralization of unreliable indigenous forces, and 
the followup by a massive Soviet ground force suggest that—lo-
gistical problems in Czechoslovakia aside—the 1968 activity must 
have been viewed as a model for future operations.76 Perhaps the 
subsequent "lessons learned" in Afghanistan may make the Soviets 
pause before they apply this "model" to any other country. 
5. Also in the organizational framework, Afghanistan suggests that 
armies will do well only those things for which they habitually 
prepare and practice. Soviet forces performed well in the move-
ment into Afghanistan, but have done poorly in dealing with the 
insurgency itself. To date, the Soviets have not adjusted to the 
conditions present in Afghanistan. They are gaining combat ex-
perience, but they have not shown the ability to match their awe-
some weapons with techniques appropriate to a counterinsurgency 
environment. Short of genocide, the methods in use at present will 
continue to be less than effective, to say the least. This seems to 
provide visible evidence of rigidity in the Soviet officer corps and 
it also points to the disadvantages of the "fundamentalist" approach 
to the interpretation of military doctrine so characteristic of the 
Soviet military. On the other hand, we ought not to entirely blame 
this failure on troop commanders. In Afghanistan, the deleterious 
effects of Pavolvsky's miscalculations are still being felt today. Fur-
thermore, research being conducted by Douglas Hart of the Pacific-
Sierra Corporation seems to indicate that doctrinal and training 
changes are at last being recommended by senior Soviet com-
manders.77 
6. One Soviet "adaptation" which should strike fear into Western 
hearts is the use of chemical weapons. The use of these weapons 
in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia again confirms that —not sur-
prisingly—the Soviets find them put to their best use against un-
protected subjects, incapable of retaliation. Afghanistan is proof 
positive that the Soviets do not consider these devices as "special 
weapons." For the Soviets, considerations of utility and not morality 
will govern their use in future conflicts. 
The helicopter gunship has also come into its own in Afghan-
istan. Win, lose, or draw the Soviet pilot cadre will be better trained 
in the future. Whether or not their Afghan combat experience will 
be easily translated into a helicopter doctrine for the high intensity 
battlefield is moot. More research needs to be done in this area. 
7. Finally, one should pause at this point and reflect on the concept 
of learning lessons from recent history. For one, the "great game" 
is far from over. Years from now, the record of events in Af-
ghanistan may appear to be far different than that which has been 
predicted in the concluding sections of this paper. More impor-
tantly, learning the wrong lessons about the utility and effectiveness 
of Soviet military power could hurt more than ignoring their ex-
perience in Afghanistan altogether. For example, a Soviet defeat 
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in Afghanistan, even if it were to prove permanent, does not prove 
any static, general proposition about Soviet power. Even if the 
Soviets must one day "cut and run," it does not prove military 
impotence. As Kenneth Waltz has reminded us, a jackhammer is 
no less powerful because it cannot be used to drill teeth.78 
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